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Winter: Keeping Faith With Nomos

KEEPING FAITH WITH NOMOS
Steven L. Winter*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Around election time, I sometimes see a bumper sticker or sign
enjoining the observer to “vote biblically.” I chuckle because I am
pretty sure there is not much voting in the Bible. The Almighty, as I
remember it, was none too pleased when the Jewish people asked for
a king like the other nations. 1 Imagine if they had insisted on a
democracy. Both in that request and in the parallel passage in
Deuteronomy, the appointment of a king is indicated by the verb שים,
to “set” or “place.” 2 There is one passage in the Christian Bible where
the Apostles, who want to be free to focus on their work, suggest that
congregants choose officials to take over ministering to the widows. 3
But, other than that, no voting. Nothing. Even more confusing to me
is the election-time sign that asks how Jesus would vote. For one thing,
I always understood him as a “render unto Caesar” 4 kind of guy whose
kingdom was “from another place.” 5 For another, I don’t see why he
would bother to vote when, presumedly, he has a direct line.

*Walter S. Gibbs Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Wayne State University Law
School. All rights reserved; © 2019.
1 1 Samuel 8:4-8 (Soncino ed. 1964).
2 Deuteronomy 17:14-15 (J.H. Hertz ed. 1936) (“When thou art come to the land which the
Lord our God giveth thee . . . and shalt say ‘I will set a king over me, like all the nations that
are about me. . . .’”). This is almost exactly the same language used in 1 Samuel 8:5. See also
Deuteronomy 1:13-15 (“Get you, from each one of your tribes, wise men, and understanding,
and full of knowledge, and I will make them heads over you. . . . So I took the heads of your
tribes, wise men, and full of knowledge and made them heads over you. . . .”).
3 Acts 6:3-4 (“Brothers and sisters, choose seven men from among you who are known to
be full of the Spirit and wisdom. We will turn this responsibility over to them and will give
our attention to prayer and the ministry of the word.”).
4 Matthew 22:21. Paul goes further, insisting that submission to authority is obedience to
God. Romans 13:1 (“Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no
authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God.”).
5 John 18:36.
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The point of these musings is that democracy and theology are
distinctive systems that work on very different principles.
Comparative study of American and Jewish law must, therefore, attend
to the fundamentally different assumptions that animate these distinct
legal systems. One of the strengths of Professor Levine’s work is his
care not to overgeneralize the similarities, instead noting critical
differences in their assumptions and approach. 6 For example, in his
discussion of the rules-versus-standards debate, he explains that only
some of the arguments in the American debate are germane to Jewish
law; the claim that rules better promote autonomy and democracy is
simply inapplicable in the religious context. 7
I want to push this point further: Among the different
assumptions that underlie theocratic and democratic systems are
profoundly different conceptions of law. One is top-down, the other
bottom-up. One understands the law as authority; the other holds out
the prospect of a law that is the product of public participation and
communal action. 8 The Greeks who invented democracy had a name
for this latter conception: They called it nomos.
More is at stake than the scholarly integrity of comparative
legal studies. Fundamental aspects of our legal system—including the
meaning of the rule of law ideal—turn on which of these basic
conceptions we embrace.
II.

WHEN LIGHTNING STRIKES

The Czech philosopher Jan Patočka offers the provocative
thesis that politics and history begin with the emergence of
philosophy. 9 For prehistorical humans, he explains, religion and the
See, e.g., SAMUEL J. LEVINE, 1 JEWISH LAW AND AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
147-60 (2018) (comparing American and Jewish law on confessions). Suzanne Stone observes
that the earlier scholarship “pointing out the similarities between the two traditions,” which
was superficial and self-referential, “often made for rather dull scholarship.” Suzanne Last
Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in Contemporary
American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 816 (1993).
7 LEVINE, supra note 6, at 198-201.
8 Cf. McCreary Cty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 873 (2005) (noting that the
objective “observer would find that the [Ten] Commandments are sanctioned as divine
imperatives, while the Declaration of Independence holds that the authority of government to
enforce the law derives ‘from the consent of the governed.’” (citation omitted)).
9 JAN PATOČKA, HERETICAL ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 139-44 (Erazim Kohác
trans., James Dodd ed. 1996). Patočka was a student of Husserl and Heidegger. He was a
founding member of Charter 77 and friend and mentor to Václav Havel; he died under
interrogation by the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia in 1977. Edward F. Findlay,
6
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natural world present life as “self-evident and given.” 10 Only with
Socratic questioning of the nature of things does “the radical question
of meaning based on the shaking of the naive, directly accepted
meaning of life” arise. 11
As long as events were understood as the product of fate, divine
plan, or the natural order of things, there could be no politics and no
history. This is not to say that humans did not act to affect their world.
But the relevant response to the gods or to fate was not an action, but
propitiation. Nor is to say that there were no histories. History as a
chronicle or sequence of events was practiced throughout the Middle
East and elsewhere. But, while these early narrative histories
understood “the past as something important for the successful future,”
their function was to provide “ritualistic writings, cultomatic records,
observations of what is fortunate and unfortunate in events and acts.” 12
These narrative histories also preserved and transmitted the normative
values of their cultures. 13 And the Bible introduced a clear vision of
the nation as the bearer of history. 14 But, these histories still worked
“as a drama that unfolds before our eyes.” 15 The idea of history as the
product of the choices and actions of human beings, rather than the
result of divine intervention or a natural order, had yet to arise.
Philosophy gives rise to politics and history, according to
Patočka, because it opens up “the realm of human possibilities” in
which freedom is understood “explicitly as something that is to be
carried out, as a possibility we can accomplish, never just accept.” 16
Politics entails taking responsibility for the consequences of our
actions and, at the same time, recognizing and respecting the
responsibility of others. And that can happen “only in a community of
equals. For that reason, the beginning of history in a strict sense is the
polis.” 17 As Ellen Meiksins Wood explains:
Classical Ethics and Postmodern Critique: Political Philosophy in Václav Havel and Jan
Patočka, 61 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS 403, 415-16 (1999).
10 PATOČKA, supra note 9, at 141.
11 Id. at 143; see id. at 61 (“[T]his discovering of meaning . . . is the meaning of Socrates’s
existence. The constant shaking of the naive sense of meaningfulness is itself a new mode of
meaning.”).
12 Id. at 29.
13 Id. at 28. See discussion infra notes 19, 93.
14 Id. at 139.
15 Id. at 49.
16 Id. at 142.
17 Id. at 148 (emphasis in original).
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In order to question the existing arrangements, there
must, at the minimum, be some belief in humanity’s
ability to control its own circumstances, some sense of
the separation of human beings from an unchangeable
natural order, and of the social from the natural realm.
There must be . . . an idea that history involves
conscious human effort to solve human problems. . . .
Such a view . . . [is] associated with some direct
experience of social change and mobility, some
practical distance from the inexorable cycles of nature,
which . . . come[s] with urban civilization. 18
I want to note two caveats before moving on: First, I am not
suggesting that the Greeks “discovered” human agency or that earlier
religious thought lacked a concept of free will. Rather, the nature of
free will is understood differently within a religious worldview that
assumes the truth of divine authority and human duty. The faculty of
choice is exercised with respect to obedience or transgression. There
are, too, commandments of worldly engagement—notably the
command in Genesis 1:28 to “replenish the earth and subdue it” and
the duty “to repair the world in the kingdom of God” or tikkun olam. 19
But, as Wood points out, “nowhere else had the emphasis on human
agency took center stage in intellectual life” as it did in Greece. 20 What
changes in Greek thought is an understanding of freedom and meaning
as themselves the product of human action, aptly summed up in
Protagoras’s famous aphorism: “Man is the measure of all things.” 21
In religious thought, the idea of equality derives from the
understanding that we are all made in God’s image. 22 In classical
Greek thought, as Hannah Arendt observes, “men were by nature

ELLEN MEIKSINS WOOD, CITIZENS TO LORDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WESTERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 43 (2008).
19 See Mishnah Gittin 5:3. Moreover, as Levine elaborates, my teacher the great Talmudic
scholar, philosopher, and theologian Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik expounded on the Genesis
story as a command both that man is to partner with God in the work of creation and, more
fundamentally, that he follow the principle of imitatio Dei in doing so. 2 SAMUEL J. LEVINE,
JEWISH LAW AND AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 26-27 (2018).
20 WOOD, supra note 18, at 43-44.
21 Id. at 57-58; see also PATOČKA, supra note 9, at 148 (“bestowing meaning on life out of
freedom and for it”).
22 Genesis 1:27.
18
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(φυσει) not equal, and needed an artificial institution, the polis, which
by virtue of its νομος [nomos] would make them equal.” 23
Second, I do not think that Patočka’s claim about the priority
of philosophy is, strictly speaking, a factual one. For one thing, the
chronology is off; Athenian democracy emerged before the
philosophers Protagoras and Socrates and before the historians
Herodotus and Thucydides. For another, Patočka’s own account
explains the emergence of the polis as a contingent response to external
military threats and internal political struggles. 24 Rather, Patočka’s
point is in the nature of a parable or thought experiment. It reveals the
conceptual architecture of politics and history as requiring the
recognition of the constructed-ness and contingency of human
knowledge and action. As Patočka says (and this quote will give you
some sense of the poetry of his writing): “It is like a landscape
illuminated by lightning, amid which humans stand-alone, with no
support, relying on solely that which presents itself—and that which
presents itself is everything.” 25
III.

WHEN VOCABULARY MATTERS

Democratic politics, then, is a politics of another order. It is
not simply a matter of majority rule or consent of the governed.
Democracy is the politics of collective self-rule, the sense that we
construct the social order that will govern us. As Pericles says in the
Funeral Oration, “we Athenians decide public questions for
ourselves.” 26 The Constitution that “We the People” adopted may set
the ground rules. But, we, the current people, are free to amend it; we
are free to decide via public debate and elections the rules that will
govern social life. This understanding of democracy entails a

23 HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 30-31 (1965). See also PATOČKA, supra note 9, at 43
(arguing that for Heraclitus, “Humans . . . become wise only when they themselves act,
accomplishing their deeds in the atmosphere of freedom ensured by the laws of the polis.”).
24 PATOČKA, supra note 9 at 41-44 (“the genesis of the polis is not a process that can be
precisely localized, attributed to these or those individuals; anonymous assumptions,
contingencies of particular situations play a role. . . ; the polis arises and sustains itself amid
internal and external struggles, . . . inter arma”).
25 Id. at 40. Cf. MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS 109 (Richard C. McCleary trans. 1964)
(“Superficially considered, our [historical] inherence destroys all truth; considered radically,
it founds a new idea of truth.”).
26 Quoted in WOOD, supra note 18, at 37 (from THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR,
Book 2.37.1 and 40.2-3).
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distinctive notion of “law” that, correspondingly, gives the-rule-of-law
ideal a very particular cast.
The original Greek word for law was thēsmos (θεσμος). From
the Greek tithemi “to put” or “place,” thēsmos signifies “something
imposed by an external agency, conceived as standing apart and on a
higher plane than the ordinary.” 27 It thus shares with the English word
“law” a common sense and conceptual etymology. The Oxford
English Dictionary defines “law” as a “rule of conduct imposed by
authority” and traces the term to the Old Norse lagu for “something
laid or fixed.” 28 This is the sense of law conveyed by the colloquial
expression “following the rules laid down.” 29
The poet Wallace Stevens says: “A new meaning is the
equivalent of a new word.” 30 The Greeks, apparently, did not think so.
As Martin Ostwald tells us, nomos (νομος) abruptly replaced thēsmos
as the Greek word for law, and this occurred at the time of the
democratic reforms of Cleisthenes around 508-07 B.C. Nomos, Wood
says, “suggests something held in common, whether pasture or
custom.” 31 As applied to legal directives, it expresses a duty of
obedience “motivated less by the authority of the agent who imposed
it than by the fact that it is regarded and accepted as valid by those who
live under it.” 32 The relation between nomos and democracy was
foundational: “Cleisthenes himself seemed to describe the new
political order as isonomia.” 33
A compound of isos, meaning “equal,” and nomos, isonomia
was the most prominent and popular of a trio of cognate terms for
democracy and its institutions that included isēgoria, the equal right of
poor and working people to address the assembly, and isokratia,

27 MARTIN OSTWALD, NOMOS AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY 55
(1969).
28 OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.wayne.edu/view/Entry/106405?rskey
=6Dr4XC&result=1&isAdvanced=true - firstMatch (“[I]n many other languages the word for
‘law’ is derived from roots meaning ‘to place’; compare, e.g., English DOOM n.,
Greek θέμις , θεσμός , Latin statutum , German gesetz”).
29 For an extended discussion see STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW,
LIFE, & MIND 206-16 (2001).
30 WALLACE STEVENS, Adagia, in OPUS POSTHUMOUS 159 (1957).
31 WOOD, supra note 18, at 36.
32 OSTWALD, supra note 27, at 158-60.
33 WOOD, supra note 18, at 36.
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equality of power. 34 Not only did isonomia precede the coinage of the
term “democracy” (a compound of demos “the people” and kratos
“power”), but it provided the normative force for the democratic ideal.
“Dēmokratia does no more than describe a fact,” Gregory Vlastos
explains, “Isonomia expresses an idea, indeed a whole set of ideas by
which the partisans of democracy justified the rule of the people.” 35
Victor Ehrenberg tells us that, by the time of Cleisthenes’s reforms,
isonomia had come to mean “not . . . a state of equal law for
everybody” but “the ideal of a community in which the citizens had
their equal share.” 36 Isonomia, Vlastos elaborates, “designates a
political order in which the rule of law and responsible government are
maintained by the equal distribution of political power.” 37
It is easy to see how revolutionary the Greek idea of democracy
actually was. And, from a modern perspective, it is also easy to see
that ideal as hypocritical. Only certain classes of people were
understood to be within its ambit; women, slaves, and other
dependents, the non-native born, were excluded. As Vlastos elsewhere
points out, the equality on which the ancient Greeks “prided
themselves was the club-privilege of those who had the good judgment
to pick their ancestors from free Athenian stock of the required purity
of blood.” 38 Perhaps these two are connected: The perception and
acceptance of equality may come more easily among the
homogeneous. But the idea of ordinary people ruling themselves
through direct participation in lawmaking was nevertheless radical.39
And it required a completely different conception of law—not as an
authority, but as a common possession and entitlement.

34 GREGORY VLASTOS, Isonomia, in 1 STUDIES IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY: THE PRESOCRATICS
105 (Daniel W. Graham ed. 1995) (originally published in 74 AMER. J. OF PHILOLOGY 337
(1954)). See also WOOD, supra note 18, at 39.
35 VLASTOS, supra note 34, at 96.
36 Victor Ehrenberg, Origins of Democracy, 1 HISTORIA: ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR ALTE
GESCHICHTE 530-31 (1950).
37 VLASTOS, supra note 34, at 107.
38 Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 42 (Jeremy Waldron ed.,
1984).
39 “Civic identity, the jurisdiction of the polis and the rule of nomos in Athens all tended
toward a kind of equality set against the aristocratic principle of rules and hierarchy.” WOOD,
supra note 18, at 66.
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WHEN LAW BECOMES RULE

We take the rule of law as a basic democratic principle. The
conventional understanding is that the rule of law serves to protect
liberty by imposing constraints on official action. This is Justice
Jackson’s characterization in Youngstown Sheet & Tube: “The essence
of our free Government is ‘leave to live by no man’s leave, underneath
the law’—to be governed by those impersonal forces which we call
law.” 40 “A government of laws and not of men” is one in which official
action is governed by preexisting rules of sufficient clarity and
generality to preclude the arbitrary whim of individuals or the brute
impositions of power. So understood, the rule-of-law ideal is closely
entwined with law’s traditional tendency toward formalism. And, as
such, law is hypostasized as an impersonal force. Lost is the sense of
law as a nomos that represents the collective force of democratic
decision-making.
The rule-of-law ideal has thus come to signify a lesser idea of
law as an authority. This is how former Attorney General Jeff Sessions
used the term in his official announcement of the Trump
Administration’s “zero tolerance” policy that separated migrant
families at the border in the Spring of 2018. 41
The transition from isonomia to this desiccated view of law as
authority “turned a profound idea into a shallow dogma.” 42 Anglicized
and imported into England from Italy at the end of the sixteenth
century, “isonomy” expressed the idea of “equality of laws to all
manner of persons.” By the seventeenth century, it was largely
displaced by the phrases “equality before the law,” “government of
law,” or “rule of law.” 43 The phrase “a government of law and not of
men” was coined by James Harrington in the late seventeenth century.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J.
concurring).
41 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL ANNOUNCES ZERO-TOLERANCE POLICY FOR
CRIMINAL ILLEGAL ENTRY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (Apr. 6, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminalillegal-entry:
To those who wish to challenge the Trump Administration’s commitment
to public safety, national security, and the rule of law, I warn you. . . . To
the Department’s prosecutors, I urge you: promoting and enforcing the
rule of law is vital to protecting a nation, its borders, and its citizens.
Id.
42 VLASTOS, supra note 34, at 105.
43 FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 164 (1978).
40
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For him, the phrase represented the rule of virtue over the corrupt—
that is, self-interested—rule of men. 44 John Adams would immortalize
this phrase in Article XXX of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, 45 and Chief Justice John Marshall would invoke it to support
his assertion of the power of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison. 46
The rule-of-law idea was, thus, dramatically transformed: What began
as a democratic ideal of self-governance only by those rules adopted
by the people themselves evolved into a notion of constitutional
authority pursuant to impersonal rules enforced by an unelected and
unaccountable judiciary.
It is no accident that Marbury’s assertion of impersonal
authority is expressed in a formalist and imperious rhetorical style.
Marshall’s argument is categorical, consisting of a series of
dichotomous alternatives between which “there is no middle
ground.” 47 The amenability of the Secretary of State to the courts’
process turns on whether his responsibilities are discretionary and,
thus, “only politically examinable” or a matter of legal duty and, thus,
“examinable by the courts.” 48 Jurisdiction is either original or
appellate. 49 Any reading of Article III that leaves it to Congress to
reapportion the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction would render the text
“mere surplusage.” 50 The Constitution is either judicially enforceable

44 JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF POLITICS 35
(J.G.A. Pocock ed. 1992) (“And as a commonwealth is a government of laws and not of men,
so is this the principality of the virtue and not of the man; if that fail or set in one, it riseth in
another. . . . “). Earlier, Harrington asked: “seeing as they that make the laws in
commonwealth are but men, the main question seems to be how a commonwealth comes to
be an empire of laws and not of men? or how the debate or result of a commonwealth is so
sure to be according to reason. . . .” Id. at 20-21. To which he answered that: “if the interest
of popular government come the nearest unto the interest of mankind, then the reason of
popular government must come the nearest unto right reason.” Id. at 22.
45 MASS. CONST. art. XXX.
46 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
47 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. Contrast Marshall’s rigid, categorical approach in Marbury with
the more nuanced understanding of language as susceptible to and expressive of differences
in degree and the dependence of meaning on context and usage that he later expresses in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 414-15 (1819).
48 Id. at 165-67. So, too, the question whether mandamus will lie turns on whether the duty
is—in familiar doctrinal terms—ministerial or discretionary. Id. at 170-71.
49 “[T]he plain import of the words seems to be, that in one class of cases its jurisdiction is
original, and not appellate; in the other it is appellate, and not original.” Id. at 175.
50 Id. at 174.
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or it is not written, paramount law. 51 Any other view is, simply, “too
extravagant to be maintained.” 52
Marshall’s impersonal authority, it turns out, is all too personal.
The ostensibly logical, all-or-nothing quality of Marshall’s reasoning
conceals a series of tendentious choices. Consider three decisive
junctures in Marshall’s argument. 53 First, Marshall presents his
reading of Article III as compelled, but the language is susceptible to
other interpretations: Article III could be read as setting an irreducible
minimum for the Court’s original jurisdiction, allowing Congress to

51 Id. at 176-77 (“Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is
either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to
alter it.”).
52 Id. at 179. The high-handed, even sarcastic tone is a repeated motif. In disclaiming any
political dimension to the case, Marshall declares:
[I]t is not wonderful that in such a case as this, the assertion, by an
individual, of his legal claims in a court of justice; to which claims it is
the duty of that court to attend; should at first view be considered by some,
as an attempt to intrude into the cabinet, and to intermeddle with the
prerogatives of the executive.
It is scarcely necessary for the court to disclaim all pretensions to such a
jurisdiction. An extravagance, so absurd and excessive, could not have
been entertained for a moment.
Id. at 169-70. In asserting judicial review of legislation as axiomatic in a system with a written
constitution, Marshall proclaims:
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it,
notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it
effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule
as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what
was established in theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too
gross to be insisted on.
Id. at 177. So, too, in considering whether delivery of the commission was essential to
Marbury’s appointment, Marshall characterizes it “as possible, and barely possible, that the
transmission of the commission, and the acceptance thereof, might be deemed necessary to
complete the right of the plaintiff.” Id. at 160. And, of course, Marshall is repeatedly
“emphatic” in asserting his authority to rule in the case. See id. at 163 (“The government of
the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will
certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation
of a vested legal right.”); Id. at 177 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.”).
53 Even the routine question of when Marbury’s commission took effect is treated in a highhanded fashion. Marshall cites no authority and fails to consider questions of policy or
function. Id. at 155-62. Jefferson, himself a well-educated and able lawyer, thought this ruling
clearly contrary to law. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 9 (also pointing out that Marshall located “the point of ‘vesting’
in a fairly mechanical fashion”).
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add to it later. 54 Or it could be read as making only a provisional
allocation of jurisdiction to be revised by Congress in light of further
experience. 55 Either alternative would be more consistent with the
Exceptions Clause. From a practical and historical point of view,
moreover, the provisional reading would seem the most sensible. After
all, the convention had failed to resolve whether there would even be
lower federal courts. And, there had never been any federal courts; at
the time, Article III was drafted, no one had any way to gauge whether
its division of the Court’s workload would be too much, too little, or
otherwise adapted to the needs of a new and unforeseeable system.
Marshall’s wooden textual analysis is a far cry from his later
admonition that this is “a constitution, intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs.” 56
Second, Marshall asserts that constitutionalism necessary
entails judicial review, but this implication is by no means compelled.
It is a commonplace that the substantive question of whether the
Constitution is paramount to ordinary legislation is separate from the
institutional question of who determines whether there is a conflict. 57
And it is a familiar response that, in a democracy, this question should
be decided by the people in the political process. 58 Again, from a
functional or policy perspective, it makes little sense to give the final
say in a democracy to the least accountable branch. Marshall says that
between judicial review and constitutional irrelevance, “there is no
middle ground.” But, of course, there is; it can be found straight away
in Marshall’s more deferential stance in McCulloch v. Maryland. 59 Its

Van Alstyne discusses the first of these two possibilities. He concludes that Article III
could be read to allow Congress to except some cases from the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
by adding them to its original jurisdiction: “This construction of the whole clause is sensible
and leaves nothing as mere surplusage.” Id. at 31.
55 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, MARK V. TUSHNET &
PAMELA S. KARLIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 34 (8th ed. 2018) (noting both alternatives). As all
the casebooks note, the Supreme Court subsequently rejected Marbury’s reading of Article
III’s jurisdictional grants as exclusive—holding that Congress has the power to give the lower
federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over cases specifically assigned to the Court’s original
jurisdiction. SeeIllinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
56 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 415 (emphasis in original).
57 Van Alstyne, supra note 53, at 22.
58 See id. at 24.
59 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 423 (contending that “to undertake here to inquire into the degree
of its necessity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to
tread on legislative ground”).
54
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modern form is the rational basis test. 60 And, if James Bradley Thayer
is correct, it was the preponderant view in the early Republic. 61
Third, Marshall’s reading of the statute as conferring original
jurisdiction over mandamus is doubly flawed. On the one hand, the
statute says no such thing: The Court’s power to issue writs of
mandamus is plainly in the appellate section of the statute. 62 On the
other hand, as any well-educated lawyer of Marshall’s era would have
known, mandamus had, from its inception, been understood as a form
appellate review. Thus, Marbury’s counsel former Attorney General
Charles Lee argued that: “The writ of mandamus is in the nature of an
appeal as to fact as well as law. It is competent for Congress to
prescribe the forms of the process by which the Supreme Court shall
exercise its appellate jurisdiction, and they may well declare a
mandamus to be one.” 63
Mandamus, as we know it, arose in the early seventeenth
century. “Lord Coke . . . appears to have invented mandamus, if not
out of whole cloth then at least out of a few rags and tatters.” 64
Together with certiorari, it was the “formal embodiment of ‘the rule of
law.’” 65 Both writs were used to superintend the actions of various
public officers and commissions, constituting the earliest version of
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938).
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893):
[H]aving regard to the great, complex, ever-unfolding exigencies of
government, much which will seem unconstitutional to one man, or body
of men, may reasonably not seem so to another; that the constitution often
admits of different interpretations; that there is often a range of choice and
judgment; that in such cases the constitution does not impose upon the
legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice;
and that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.
This was the view adopted by Holmes in his celebrated Lochner dissent. Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 73-74 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
62 Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 provides, in relevant part:
The supreme court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit
courts, and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after specially
provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition to the
district courts, when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles
and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office,
under the authority of the United States.
63 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 148 (1803) (argument of counsel).
64 LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 462 (1965) (discussing
James Bagge’s Case, 11 Coke 93b, 98a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271, 1278 (K.B. 1615)).
65 Id. at 333.
60
61
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what we now call administrative law. In The Cardiff Bridge Case, 66
Lord Holt extended certiorari and mandamus to exercises of
“jurisdiction,” which, as Maitland explains, was understood as any
“application of the law to a particular case.” 67 The idea was that, when
an officer, commission or corporation acted contrary to law, it was
acting “quasi-judicially” in misapplying the law to the facts of the case
before it. 68
Lee, then, was correct on both counts. Mandamus lay because
in refusing to deliver the commission despite it having been signed and
sealed, Madison misapplied the law (at least as Marshall saw it)
governing Marbury’s entitlement to that office. 69 Perhaps this
blackletter doctrine seemed too much a legal fiction for Marshall. 70
But it remains true that a “competent” Congress could well have
thought—as Lee argued—that giving the Supreme Court the power to
issue writs of mandamus “to any courts appointed, or persons holding
office, under the authority of the United States” was a proper exercise
of appellate jurisdiction as it had been understood for nearly a century.
All the more so if, as Marshall says in McCulloch, “the sound
construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature
that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it
confers are to be carried into execution.” 71
66 Rex v. Glamorganshire Inhabitants, 1 Ld. Raym. 580, 91 Eng. Rep. 1287 (1700) (review
of raise of taxpayer rates for the repair of the Cardiff Bridge); Groenvelt v. Burwell, 1 Ld.
Raym. 454, 469, 91 Eng. Rep. 1202, 1212 (1699) (all agencies empowered to affect property
rights are “courts” from which lie an appeal to the Kings Bench).
67 JAFFE, supra note 64, at 351 (quoting Frederick William Maitland, “The Shadows and
Silences of Real Life,” in 1 THE COLLECTED PAPERS 467, 478 (1911)) (http://lfoll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/871/Maitland_0242-01_EBk_v6.0.pdf).
See also STANLEY
ALEXANDER DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 375-85 (3d ed. 1973)
(“Local government bore a judicial aspect. . . . It was assumed that the writs of certiorari and
prohibition, by which [local governments] were controlled in their capacity as courts of
summary jurisdiction, were equally appropriate devices for superintending the exercise of their
multifarious governmental functions.”) (final edition edited by de Smith); see also DE SMITH,
WOOLF, & JOWELL, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 624, 632 (5th ed. 1995) (by
Mansfield’s time, mandamus was used “to compel inferior tribunals to exercise jurisdiction
and discretion according to law.”).
68 For a nineteenth century American example, see People, ex rel. Case v. Collins, 19 Wend.
36, 58 (N.Y. 1837).
69 Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803) (“The question whether a right has
vested or not, is, in its nature, judicial. . . .”).
70 Indeed, Marshall offers a strikingly realist, functional analysis of Marbury’s writ.
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 175-76 (“To issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper, is in
effect the same as to sustain an original action for that paper, and therefore seems not to belong
to appellate, but to original jurisdiction.”).
71 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
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Marshall’s assertion of law as authority in Marbury is formalist
in all three senses of the term. 72 It is conceptualist in its deceptive allor-nothing reasoning; it is mechanical in its abstraction from context,
function, and policy; and it is duplicitous in pretending to decide the
case according to logic and “law without ever acknowledging that the
law [he is] ‘following’ is in actuality a product of [his] own interpretive
acts.” 73 Marshall’s performance in Marbury is a rhetorical tour de
force, but his presentation of the rule of law is sheer ipse dixit.
There is, however, a certain inevitability to this attitude once
one abstracts the rule of law from its democratic origins. To
paraphrase Marshall, those who expound the law must of necessity
insist on the incontestability of their authority. 74 This is the common
lesson of Walker v. City of Birmingham 75 and the Talmudic story of
the Oven of Achnai. 76
In Walker, the Court upheld the criminal contempt convictions
of civil rights organizers, including Dr. King, who disobeyed an ex
parte injunction they believed unconstitutional. (This was the arrest
that led to King’s famous Letter from a Birmingham Jail.) It was not
that Dr. King and the others were mistaken; in a later case, the Court
agreed with them on the merits. 77 It was, rather, because they had
failed to challenge the underlying injunction through the ordinary
procedures. “This Court cannot hold that the petitioners were
constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law and carry
their battle to the streets.” 78 As Robert Cover says, Walker stands for
a strong view of equity in which the judge “must have nearly absolute
authority. . . . Walker tells [the judge] that the Court’s authority is
greater than its warrant in the interpretation of the Constitution or the
72 On the different senses of the term and the conceptual relationship between them, see
Steven L. Winter, John Roberts’s Formalist Nightmare, 63 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 501, 501-07
(2009).
73 Id. at 506-07.
74 As Justice Jackson famously quipped: “We are not final because we are infallible, but we
are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
75 See 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (holding that the underlying unconstitutionality of an injunction
is not a defense to a subsequent contempt citation when the defendants failed to avail
themselves of state court processes to challenge the injunction directly).
76 Tractate Bava Metzia 59a-b. Suzanne Stone provides a thorough vetting of the story and
the extensive and multi-valent traditional Jewish commentary on it. Stone, supra note 6, at
540-65. For an instructive analysis that mines the traditional sources for additional insight,
see Nachman Levine, The Oven of Achnai Re-Deconstructed, 45 HEBREW STUDIES 27 (2004).
77 See generally Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
78 Walker, 388 U.S. at 321.
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law. Even when wrong, the judge is to act and is entitled to be
obeyed.” 79
So, too, in the Achnai story, the view of the majority of the
Sanhedrin (the Great Assembly or rabbinic Court) prevailed over
Rabbi Eliezer’s various miraculous proofs that included a bat kol
(literally, “daughter of a voice” or “echo”) from Heaven affirming the
correctness of his position. The Oven of Achnai story has many
interpretations—perhaps the most interesting is as a dispute between
the authority of Masora or tradition, represented by Rabbi Eliezer, and
that of the contemporary rabbinic majority. 80 But, the conventionallyunderstood lesson is that even Divine Truth must yield to the authority
of the Sanhedrin. After all, the Sanhedrin’s response to Rabbi
Eliezer’s stubborn attempt to substantiate his views was to
excommunicate him. Thus, Professor Stone appropriately analogizes
the lesson of the Achnai story to Owen Fiss’s provocative declaration
that “in legal interpretation there is only one school and attendance is
mandatory.” 81
For the rabbis, it is the exclusive province of the Sanhedrin to
interpret the law just as, for Marshall, it “is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 82 But, in
an actual democracy—that is, in a society of self-governing citizens—
that responsibility lies with the people.
V.

WHEN RELATION APPEARS

Robert Cover radicalizes our understanding of law as nomos in
large part by subverting the conventional antinomies of obedience and
79 Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (1983). As Cover points out, the key precedent relied on by the Walker
Court—Howat v. Kansas, 285 U.S. 181 (1922)—was an instance of the infamous labor
injunction.
80 See Stone, supra note 6, at 856-57; Nachman Levine, supra note 76, at 34, 38 (and the
sources cited at 34 n.28). This nicely parallels the contemporary debate between originalists
and those who understand the Constitution as the product of complex, ongoing processes of
interpretation. Cf. Robert Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia’s Jurisprudence,
12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1685 (1991), discussed in Stone, supra note 6, at 839-43.
81 Stone, supra note 6, at 860 (quoting Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34
STAN. L. REV. 739, 746 (1982)). Stone is careful to note, however, that the Talmud was deeply
ambivalent about Rabbi Eliezer’s excommunication. Id. at 857. Nachman Levine, supra note
76, develops this theme in great depth.
82 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177. This is the common refrain whenever the Court asserts its
authority in the face of democratic processes. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 536 (1997).
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disobedience, legal precept and social meaning, nature and nurture.
Cover’s analysis of each of these oppositions works an aufhebung—
an overcoming that simultaneously destroys and preserves the
antinomy by transforming it into a new synthesis. 83 Indeed, he plainly
announces this dialectical methodology in the epigraph of Nomos and
Narrative, which quotes the first stanza of a poem by Wallace Stevens:
“A. A violent order is disorder; B. A great disorder is an order. These/
Two things are one. (Pages of illustrations.).” 84
Despite his use of Jewish religious texts, Cover’s primary
influence is Greek. This is clear in his choice of the terms nomos and
paideia as the framework for his analysis. 85 For the pre-Socratics, “the
distinction between physis (nature) and nomos (law, custom, or
convention)” was a “preoccupation” that would become their “central
intellectual problem.” 86 For Cover, the opposition of physis and nomos
is transformed into inherent, parallel conditions of existence:
This nomos is as much “our world” as is the physical
universe of mass, energy, and momentum. Indeed, our
apprehension of the structure of the normative world is
no less fundamental than our appreciation of the
structure of the physical world. Just as the development
of increasingly complex responses to the physical
attributes of our world begins with birth itself, so does
the parallel development of the responses to personal
otherness that define the normative world. 87

83 Cf. LEVINE, supra note 19, at 40-41 (“Cover’s depiction of the relationship between
nomos and narrative transcends the notion of integrating two apparently distinct concepts
representing distinct intellectual disciplines, to arrive at a better understanding of each. . . .”).
84 Cover, supra note 79, at 4 (quoting WALLACE STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in THE
COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE STEVENS 215 (1954)). Tom Grey observes that Stevens’s
thought is characterized by a dialectical perspectivism that avoids the closure of a Hegelian
synthesis, “a poetic practice that exemplifies a way to live with, and through, the practical
paradox of perspectivism.” THOMAS C. GREY, THE WALLACE STEVENS CASE: LAW AND THE
PRACTICE OF POETRY 73-75 (1991); see also WINTER, supra note 29, at 65-67 (discussing this
poem and Stevens’s dialectical understanding of metaphor and reality). Cover’s thought, as
we shall see, is often dialectical in this same paradoxical (that is, post-Hegelian) way.
85 Paideia refers to the ancient Greek practice of education and socialization of the person
into the world of the polis.
Indeed, Cover acknowledges that some might question his application of “a distinctly Greek
concept to the very different Jewish civilization of the ancient world.” Cover, supra note 79,
at 13 n.34.
86 WOOD, supra note 18, at 53.
87 Cover, supra note 79, at 5.
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Here, Cover’s dialectical move is to take an antithesis of the
necessary (that is, physical nature) and the contingent (that is, the
normative world of law and culture) and—in a move reminiscent of
the Existentialists—transpose the two in a new synthesis in which what
appeared contingent emerges as necessary for us. 88
Cover makes an analogous dialectical move with respect to law
and narrative. On the one hand, “every narrative is insistent in its
demand for its prescriptive point.” 89 On the other, law cannot be
understood without the narratives that give it history, purpose, and
meaning: “For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue
a scripture.” 90 Moreover, the relation between legal precept and social
meaning is entirely circular. Law may appear to stand above and
organize the social according to its command. But, for Cover,
formalism of this sort is an illusion. “[P]rescription, even when
embodied in a legal text, [cannot] escape its origin and its end in
experience, in the narratives that are the trajectories plotted upon
material reality by our imaginations.” 91
In Cover’s thought, law and narrative form a dialectical relation
in which each frame and change the meaning of the other. Perhaps his
strongest example comes from the fight over slavery. He notes that the
abolitionist Wendell Phillips “agreed” with Chief Justice Taney’s
interpretation that the Fugitive Slave Clause “dictated the return of
runaway slaves.” 92 But, Phillips renounced any obligation under the
Constitution while Taney, of course, enforced it. Because abolitionists
like Phillips and establishment jurists like Taney operated within
different constitutional narratives, they “could only be said to agree on
the meaning of the document abstracted from any need or desire to act
See MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 25, at 109 (“Since we are all hemmed in by history, it
is up to us to understand that whatever truth we may have is to be gotten not in spite of but
through our historical inherence.”). Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, the objective and the subjective
are supplanted by the historical, and the necessary and the contingent are aufgehoben in the
situated. Similarly, for Sartre, humanity is that “which escapes contingency by being its own
foundation.”
JEAN PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY 615 (Hazel Barnes trans. 1956). Although Cover’s
dialectical move here closely parallels that of the Existentialists, there is no direct evidence in
his writings that they were an influence. Cf. Ronald R. Garet, Meaning and Ending, 96 YALE
L.J. 1801, 1801 n.5 (1987) (observing that the “idea of nomos enjoys in Bob’s writing
somewhat the same status as the idea of ‘existence’ in the writings of Kierkegaard or Sartre,”
but providing no references).
89 Cover, supra note 79, at 5.
90 Id. at 5-6.
91 Id. at n.109.
92 Id. at 37.
88
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upon it. . . . And no two people can be said to agree on what the text
requires if they disagree on the circumstances in which it will warrant
their actions.” 93
The Jewish tradition recognizes two parallel sources that
together comprise the Oral Law: the halacha (laws) and the aggada
(stories and parables). 94 Although there is a superficial resemblance,
the relation between nomos and narrative is not analogous to that
between halacha and aggada. First, the terms or elements of the
analogy do not align. Nomos does not map onto halacha. Nomos,
rather, is the third term or output function of a dialectic of law and
narrative. “Once understood in the context of the narratives that give
it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed,
but a world in which we live.” 95 If one were to draw this analogy, one
might say that just as the complex relations of law and narrative
constitute a nomos, halacha and aggada together comprise the
Torah. 96
But, second, even that analogy is not quite apt because the
relation between the elements is fundamentally different. Halacha and
aggada are complementary elements of a single tradition. Thus,
Levine quotes Hayim Nahman Bialik as saying that the two “are really
one—two sides of the same shield.” 97 But, this is not a view that
Id. at 37 n.109. For an analysis of this passage, see WINTER, supra note 29, at 343-44.
LEVINE, supra note 19, at 20-22. Halacha includes the religious laws both ritual (such
as the rules governing kashrut and the Sabbath) and civil (such as those governing contract
and tort). Aggada refers to the body of stories, including the Midrash, that complement the
halacha and encode moral lessons. Cf. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the
Agon between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2267-68 (1989)
(“The entire Jewish tradition of midrash, of interpretive storytelling, is a tradition of
lawmaking.”) Levine notes that halacha can also be used more broadly to refer to the religious
way of life as in Rabbi Soloveitchik’s Halakhic Man. JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, HALAKHIC
MAN (Lawrence Kaplin trans. 1983). He argues that because the word halacha (from the
Hebrew verb “ הלךwalk”) connotes the proper path in life, its use parallels Cover’s concept of
nomos. As noted in passing, see text accompanying note 29 supra, many of the basic words
for law in multiple languages derive from the metaphoric conception RULES ARE PATHS.
WINTER, supra note 29, at 206-09. The word halacha for law shares this same conceptual
basis, as in Deuteronomy 28:14, “and thou shalt not turn from the words that I command you
today, neither right nor left, to walk after other gods to serve them.” See also Leviticus 26:3
(“If you walk in my statutes.”).
95 Cover, supra note 79, at 4-5.
96 Cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1604 (1986) (referring
to “the normative universe —of Torah, Nomos”).
97 LEVINE, supra note 19, at 36. The metaphor of a shield is, in one sense, curious. A shield
has an outer and inner face, which does not correspond to any obvious mapping of halacha
and aggada. The shield metaphor does make sense if one thinks of Judaism as an example of
what Cover calls an insular nomos. On this view, halacha and aggada might represent two
93
94
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Wallace Stevens would endorse; in a later stanza, he dismisses such
monism as “squamous.” 98 For Bialik, the relation between the two
elements is fixed: halacha crystallizes aggada, while aggada refines
halacha. But Cover, as we have seen, understands law and narrative
as existing in a mutually transformative, dialectical relation.
One could, of course, take such a dialectical view of halacha
and aggada. Thus, Cover gives the example of the law of
primogeniture stated in Deuteronomy 21:15-17 which is embedded in
a series of biblical narratives about the patriarchs in which the normal
order of succession is overturned. Cover reads this as a case (similar
to the slavery example) in which the story’s deviation from the legal
rules signifies an exceptional quality of divine destiny. 99 But, Levine
takes issue with this layered interpretation. He argues, alternatively,
that Deuteronomy’s later rule of primogeniture did not yet apply to the
earlier normative world of the patriarchs and that the rule was, anyway,
qualified by exceptions that explain the patriarchs’ actions. 100 This
dispute between Professors Levine and Cover underscores the
profound difference between halacha and nomos. Religious law
typically prizes formal consistency. 101 Cover’s account in Nomos and
Narrative prefers the redemptive nomos over the insular version and
the juris-generative power of diverse communities over the juris-pathic
function of the courts.
Third, and relatedly, Cover’s anti-formalist understanding of
law is at odds with the notion of law at work in halacha. For Bialik,
layers of protection from the outside world. But this only complicates the analogy between
halacha and aggada, on one hand, and nomos and narrative, on the other. Cover’s theory not
only encompasses, but explicitly favors non-insular nomoi such as those he identifies under
the rubric of redemptive constitutionalism. Cover, supra note 78, at 67-68 and note n.195.
98 STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 84, at 215:
After all the pretty contrast of life and death
Proves that these opposite things partake of one,
At least that was the theory, when bishops’ books
Resolved the world. We cannot go back to that.
The squirming facts exceed the squamous mind,
If one may say so. And yet relation appears . . .
99 See Genesis 25:23 (recounting Rebecca’s dream in which God tells her that she will bear
twins and “the older shall serve the younger.”).
100 LEVINE, supra note 19, at 13-16. See also Stone, supra note 6, at 835-47 (offering “to
provide a framework for understanding rabbinic interpretive practice within its specific
religious context”).
101 Cover, supra note 79, at 22 (“It is tempting to reconcile the stories to the rule by creating
exceptions or by positing circumstances that would remove the case from the rule. These
strategies may be useful to the later legist whose concern is a consistent body of precepts.”).
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the dichotomy of halacha and aggada maps the conventional
dichotomies of reason versus rhetoric and the objective versus the
subjective. Thus, for Bialik, the arrows “of halacha fly straight and
true, with the strength and directness imparted by a well-drawn bow”
while the “shafts of aggada, are uncertain in their aim, and come with
a swerve. . . .” 102 For Cover, in contrast, the social contingency of
law—the fact that it has its origin and end in experience—makes it
recalcitrant to formalization and effective domestication. “The
uncontrolled character of meaning,” he says, is “destabilizing.”
“Precepts must ‘have meaning,’ but they necessarily borrow it from
materials created by social activity that is not subject to the strictures
of provenance that characterize what we call formal lawmaking.” 103
Fourth, where halacha and aggada are the handiwork of divine
provenance and rabbinic authority, Cover understands nomos as the
product of human culture and imagination. “The community posits a
law, external to itself, that it is committed to obeying and that it does
obey in dedication to its understanding of that law.” 104 The process
“begins when someone accepts the demands of interpretation and,
through the personal act of commitment, affirms the position taken.”105
This commitment is then objectified as an external demand that is
embodied in an origin story—“a story of how the law, now object,
came to be, and more importantly, how it came to be one’s own.” 106
Law for Cover is a human creation—a nomos in the Greek sense—and
therefore, both contingent and contestable in a way that divine law is
not.
Fifth, and finally, the role of disobedience in Cover’s work has
no analog in the biblical worldview. One of the singular passages of
Nomos and Narrative is Cover’s unpacking of the civil rights sit-in
movement (of which he was a part). 107 Cover deftly subverts the
dichotomy of obedience and disobedience. The demonstrators, he
LEVINE, supra note 19, at 39.
Cover, supra note 79, at 18. Cover’s anti-positivist argument is developed in WINTER,
supra note 29, at 340-47.
104 Cover, supra note 79, at 45 (emphasis added).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 45. Cover refers to the Amish twice in this passage, so it is clear that this account
is meant to include religious nomoi as well as secular ones. For a discussion of this passage
and the role of the personification metaphor in our basic conception of law, see WINTER, supra
note 29, at 332-39.
107 For an extended analysis of this passage, see Steven L. Winter, The “Power” Thing, 82
VA. L. REV. 721, 826-30 (1996).
102
103
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argues, are obeying what they understand as the bona fide command
of the Equal Protection Clause in the face of segregation laws they
believe unconstitutional. “There is,” Cover says, “both ‘disobedience’
and ‘obedience’ in either case.” 108 On the one hand, the demonstrators
are defying the segregation laws sanctioned by the courts. On the other
hand, “only obedience to the movement’s own interpretation of the
Constitution was fidelity to the understanding of law by which the
movement’s members would live uncoerced.” 109 Conversely, the
judges asked to enforce segregation face a similar dilemma. They can
obey the segregation laws. Or they can disobey the law in the name of
the Constitution. There are obedience and disobedience in either case.
The sit-in in defiance of the segregation law thus “forces the judge to
choose between affirming his interpretation of the official law through
violence against the protesters and permitting the polynomia of legal
meaning. . . .” 110
A great order is a disorder; a great disorder is an order. These
two things are one but not in the sense that they can be reconciled. “A
and B are not,” Stevens says, “like statuary, posed/ For a vista in the
Louvre,” but “things chalked/ On the sidewalk so that the pensive man
may see.” 111
The thrust of Cover’s Nomos and Narrative is to reject “the
imperial mode of world maintenance” characterized by law as an
impersonal authority. 112 Cover favors legal pluralism. He endorses a
“paideic” nomos of law and narrative in which there is “a common and
personal way” of education into and performance of the law.113
Cover’s vision of law is intimately social. 114 It is anarchic (from the
Greek an arkhos, “without leader”) but not lawless. On the contrary,
the nomoi that he describes are permeated by law of the strongest
sort—that is, law capable of inspiring not just obedience, but
commitments spelled out “in the medium of blood.” 115 Still, Cover’s

Cover, supra note 79, at 47.
Id.
110 Id. at 47-48.
111 STEVENS, Connoisseur of Chaos, in THE COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 84, at 215.
112 Cover, supra note 79, at 16.
113 Id. at 13-14.
114 See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1602 n.2 (1986)
(“[T]he thrust of Nomos [i]s that the creation of legal meaning is an essentially cultural activity
which takes place (or best takes place) among smallish groups”).
115 Cover, supra note 79, at 47.
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view is deeply anti-statist; he champions the multiplicity of law that is
inevitably generated by “the too fertile forces of jurisgenesis.” 116
Between the imperial mode of law as an authority and the
polynomia celebrated by Cover, there is a middle ground. This is not
a reconciliation, but an aufhebung in which we sublimate the
multiplicity of our laws to the alterable outcomes of democratic selfgovernance. If nomos is the idea of law accepted as a common
possession and isonomia the ideal of a political order founded on the
equal distribution of political power, 117 then collective self-governance
consists of the sharing of authority with others under conditions of
equality, mutual recognition, and respect. 118
We live in a society more complex and more pluralist than the
ancient Greeks; their resolution, no matter how instructive, cannot be
ours. But, the paradigm of nomos offers a vision of a law that better
keeps faith with our democratic heritage and aspirations.

Id. at 16.
See Steven L. Winter, What a Vote Is Worth, 19 J. OF LAW IN SOCIETY 264 (2019).
118 I elaborate this view in Steven L. Winter, Down Freedom’s Main Line, 41 NETHERLANDS
JOURNAL OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 202 (2012) (special issue).
116
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